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ARTICLES
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LAW IN
MONTANA
by Thomas H. Mahan*
INTRODUCTION
Family law in Montana is passing through a period of signifi-
cant change. The recent adoption of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act' has altered the entire statutory foundation of divorce
law. Thoroughgoing changes have also occurred in the statutes gov-
erning parentage and non-parental child custody.2 Though the trend
of court decision in the previous decade was toward modernization
of the law, this process has been hastened by the legislature.
With change comes uncertainty. In the ten years from 1962
through 1972, there were approximately thirty family law cases de-
cided by the Montana supreme court. During the next three years,
there were another thirty. Since the beginning of 1976, however,
more than forty decisions have been handed down, including an
unusually large number of reversals. Some of these are the predicta-
ble transition cases, requiring the supreme court to establish by case
law that the new statutes mean what they say. Others, however,
involve important questions of first impression in Montana, and in
the United States.
It has been said that the UMDA codifies the policy of "no-
fault" divorce. Though one of the stated purposes of the Act is to
strengthen the integrity of marriage,' it makes the legal dissolution
of marriage a relatively uncomplicated and nearly irresistable pro-
cedure. All previously known defenses to a divorce action are abol-
ished;' and under the Act's "irretrievable breakdown" standard,'
* B.S., United States Military Academy, 1946; B.A., University of Montana, 1956; J.D.,
University of Montana, 1956. The author wishes to express his appreciation to William Boggs,
Sherry Matteucci, and Mary Van Buskirk, all of whom furnished valuable assistance in the
research and drafting of this article.
1. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 48-301 to
341 (1947) [hereinafter cited R.C.M. 1947], enacted Ch. 536, Laws of Montana (1975),
effective January 1, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the UMDA or "the Act").
2. "Youth in need of care," R.C.M. 1947, §§ 10-1301 to 1322, enacted Ch. 328, Laws of
Montana (1974); guardianship, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 91A-5-201 to 212 (Uniform Probate Code),
enacted Ch. 365, Laws of Montana (1974); Uniform Parentage Act, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 61-301
to 327, enacted Ch. 512, Laws of Montana (1975).
3. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-302(2) (Supp. 1977).
4. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-317(5) (Supp. 1977).
5. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-319 (Supp. 1977). In practice, an analogous standard was often
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the very act of filing the petition should furnish almost conclusive
justification for granting a divorce. Despite the ease and speed with
which the bonds of matrimony may be dissolved, however, all the
natural complications incident to that dissolution-children, prop-
erty, money-remain, and cannot be resolved without the tradi-
tional attorney-supervised negotiations or adversary litigation. The
UMDA sets forth new rules for dealing with the old difficulties, but
they remain. The same can be said concerning the delicate matters
of adoption, guardianship, and child welfare and abuse.
This article offers a comprehensive survey of recent Montana
cases decided under our family statutes. While the statutory provi-
sions themselves are often referred to, no extensive commentary on
the legislation is offered,6 but rather a review of the developing case
law based upon it.
I. CHILD CUSTODY
A. Custody Determinations Related to Divorce
In a dissolution proceeding, custody is to be determined in ac-
cordance with the best interests of the child. The UMDA sets forth
five possible determinants of best interest which the court must
consider in deciding custody: (1) the wishes of the child's parent or
parents as to his custody, (2) the wishes of the child as to his cus-
todian, (3) the interaction and inter-relationship of the child with
his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interest, (4) the child's adjust-
ment to his home, school, and community and (5) the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved.' Once a custodian is
appointed after a balancing of these factors, he or she may direct
the child's upbringing, including his education, health care, and
religious training. Only if the court finds, upon motion of the non-
custodial parent, that the child's physical health or emotional de-
velopment would be significantly impaired otherwise, may it place
a specific limitation upon- the custodian's authority to rear.8
These standards for judicial resolution of contested custody,
while articulated in much greater detail than before, do not depart
significantly from previous Montana law, where custody was also
applied under the former law; see, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632
(1965).
6. In addition to the commission comments which accompany the uniform acts (in the
case of the UMDA, an extensive and detailed commentary), see Comment, The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act: New Statutory Solutions to Old Problems, 37 MONT. L. REv. 119
(1976).
7. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332 (Supp. 1977).
8. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-338 (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 39
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predicated on considerations of "the welfare of the child." Under the
older system of divorce, the custody determination was made, in
theory at least, independently of the finding of fault, and in fact
custody was regularly awarded to the parent against whom the di-
vorce decree was rendered Even the much-used "tender years"
presumption" was often rebutted, and many custody awards of
young children made to the father." The pre-UMDA case law stood
basically for the same policy embodied in the UMDA: that parental
struggles for control of children should be resolved in favor of the
situation likely to be most beneficial for the children in the long run.
There have been but two significant original custody appeals
determined under the UMDA, both involving the "tender years"
presumption." Each, taken by the mother, involved an identical
issue-whether granting custody of a small child to the father in a
dissolution proceeding was proper. Both appellants argued that the
tender years presumption, though now absent from the statutes,
should still control at common law if the evidence indicated that
both parents were fit and proper custodians, and the evidence was
evenly balanced on best interest. The supreme court upheld both
district court custody awards to the father, but in two problematical
opinions agreed with the appellants that a tender years presumption
still exists in Montana.
In Tweeten v. Tweeten, the court confined itself to stating that
the tender years presumption exists; but "in this jurisdiction each
child custody case will be decided on its own facts rather than by
the use of 'controlling or conclusive' presumptions."' 3 In Isler v.
Isler, a more extensive but perplexing analysis was advanced. The
court reaffirmed that "the presumption continues under the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act,"" and then explained how it works:
It . . .appears that the preference for the mother comes into play
in Kentucky at the close of the evidence. This is not the case in
9. See e.g., Hurly v. Hurly, 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359 (1966); Anderson v. Anderson,
145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632 (1965).
10. R.C.M. 1947, § 91-4515(2), repealed by Ch. 365, Laws of Montana (1974), provided
that: "[O]ther things being equal, if the child be of tender years, it should be given to the
mother; if it be of an age to require education and preparation for labor and business, then
to the father."
11. E.g., Cleverly v. Stone, 141 Mont. 204, 378 P.2d 653 (1962); Anderson v. Anderson,
145 Mont. 244, 400 P.2d 632 (1965); Veseth v. Veseth, 147 Mont. 169, 410 P.2d 930 (1966);
Hurly v. Hurly, 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359 (1966).
12. Tweeten v. Tweeten, - Mont. __, 563 P.2d 1141 (1977); Isler v. Isler,
Mont. -, 566 P.2d 55 (1977).
13. __ Mont. at - , 563 P.2d at 1144. Neither here, nor in Isler, does the court
intimate whether the old statutory correlative of the tender-years presumption, the
"preparation for business and labor" presumption in favor of the father, also continues to live
in the common law.
14. - Mont. at - , 566 P.2d at 58.
19781
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Montana. Here, the parties proceed from the presumption and
once it is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence there is no
preference for the mother. In meeting this burden, the father need
not prove the mother to be unfit.'5
There are several questionable points in this analysis. First, it is
difficult to see how the custody determination with the presumption
operating differs from the determination as it would occur without
it. The court does not say it increases the father's burden of proof.
Therefore, it appears that the only way in which the presumption
could have any effect in the "best interest" analysis, is if both the
mother and father offered no evidence whatsoever concerning cus-
tody-an unlikely eventuality in a court contest for control of a
child. Second, it is odd that the "common law" tender years pre-
sumption should be held to operate differently than the former sta-
tutory one, which by its terms was clearly meant to be applied at
the close of the evidence.'" Third, since the legislature repealed the
tender years presumption just prior to enacting the UMDA, one
must wonder why the court did not at least consider the possibility
that the legislature meant to abolish it altogether. The logic of this
case is elusive, but one thing is clear: an attorney representing a
mother in a contested custody matter had better prove it is in the
best interest of a small child to grow up under her tutelage; any
presumption to that effect is "thin air."
B. Modifications of Custody After Divorce
The former Montana statute conferring power on district courts
to render custody decrees in divorce actions provided that: "the
judge may give such direction for the custody, care, and education
of the children . . . as may seem necessary or proper, and may at
any time vacate or modify the same."" In a leading pre-UMDA
case, the supreme court held that: "all child custody orders are
interlocutory in nature, and conditioned by what the district court
. . . believes to be for the well-being of the children.""8 Since the
trial court retained jurisdiction, it was not unusual for custody bat-
tles to be waged interminably in the courts, and petitions for modifi-
cation often resulted in redeterminations of the same issues relating
to best interest as were decided in the first decree.' 9 In order to avoid
this undesirable result, the rule evolved that a petition for modifica-
15. Id.
16. The qualifying phrase in the repealed § 91-4515(2), "other things being equal," to
be sensible must mean "as shown by the evidence."
17. R.C.M. 1947, § 21-138, now repealed.
18. State ex rel. Shelhamer v. District Court, 159 Mont. 11, 13, 494 P.2d 928, 931 (1972).
19. E.g., Cleverly v. Stone, 141 Mont. 204, 378 P.2d 653 (1962).
[Vol. 39
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tion would not be granted unless "a substantial change of circum-
stances" affecting the welfare of the children could be demon-
strated.' The nature of the change of circumstances which would
justify modification was largely undefined, however. It was gener-
ally understood to encompass significant changes in the conduct or
circumstances of either party or the child, which might indicate to
the court that the best interest of the child would be served by an
alteration of his custodial arrangements. The development of this
doctrine did not significantly reduce the incidence of repetitious
attempts to modify custody orders."
One essential policy of the UMDA is the avoidance of unceasing
custodial strife, through the judicial provision of stable custody ar-
rangements for children. To implement this policy, the UMDA sec-
tion on modifications of custody provides that:
(1) No motion to modify a custody decree may be made ear-
lier than two (2) years after its date, unless the court permits it to
be made on the basis of affidavits that there is reason to believe
the child's present environment may endanger seriously his physi-
cal, mental, moral, or emotional health.
(2) The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless
it finds upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior
decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of
the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances
of the child or his custodian, and that the modification is necessary
to serve the best interest of the child. In applying these standards
the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the
prior decree unless:
(a) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(b) the child has been integrated into the family of the peti-
tioner with consent of the custodian; or
(c) the child's present environment endangers seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm likely
to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its
advantages to him.
(3) Attorney fees and costs shall be assessed against a party
seeking modification if the court finds that the modification action
is vexatious and constitutes harassment.2
This section has been set forth verbatim in several recent opinions,
along with extensive supporting quotations from the Commission-
20. Baertch v. Baertch, 155 Mont. 98, 467 P.2d 142 (1970); Simon v. Simon, 154 Mont.
193, 461 P.2d 851 (1969).
21. Sometimes these attempts involved unusual procedural ramifications. In Hurly v.
Hurly, 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359 (1966), the supreme court modified the original trial court
custody award on the basis of events occurring subsequent to the trial.
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339 (Supp. 1977).
19781
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ers' Notes;23 and it seems clear that the supreme court intends to
follow it strictly. This represents a significant departure from prior
law; previously, various factors bearing on welfare of the child were
open to inquiry in a modification action, whereas § 48-339 expresses
a very strong presumption that the welfare of the child is best served
by stable and definitive custody arrangements, whatever their char-
acter.
In its first consideration of the modification provision in late
1976, the supreme court announced that it effected no change in
Montana law.24 Soon thereafter, however, the campaign of strict
construction began. In Holm v. Holm, 5 a noncustodial mother peti-
tioned for modification based entirely on a substantial change of
circumstances in her own (not the custodial) situation. -Her petition
was filed less than two years after the prior custody judgment. The
supreme court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
the proceeding "based on the best interests of the children where,
as here, it found the custodian 'is and has been a proper father."'2 6
There was no allegation that the child was seriously endangered;
therefore a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should have
been granted. The court also indicated the plaintiff could not have
met any of the section's criteria for modification, even had the peti-
tion been timely. It remanded the cause to the district court for the
possible assessment of attorney's fees against the petitioner for vex-
atious action.
In Groves v. Groves," the supreme court followed up dicta from
Holms concerning the exclusiveness of the three alternative prere-
quisites to modification set forth in § 48-339(2), by stating defini-
tively that "it is plaintiff's responsibility to prove that modification
is necessary to serve the best interests of the child, and to do so she
must satisfy one of the conditions specified in subsections (a), (b)
and (c), section 48-339(2). ''2s The court thus held that the only
aspects of changed circumstances ever justifying a modification of
custody are those enumerated in § 48-339(2): consent, integration
into the household with consent, and serious danger to the child.
Groves also describes the burden of proof required of a petitioner for
23. In one of these cases, Holm v. Holm, __ Mont. __, 560 P.2d 905 (1977), after
quoting extensively from Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 409, explaining the policy of
stable custody, the court stated: "This rationale is persuasive. It makes sense. It explains the
purpose, intent, and operation of the statute. We adopt it." __ Mont. at -, 560 P.2d at
908.
24. Foss v. Leifer, - Mont. -_, 550 P.2d 1309 (1976); Erhardt v. Erhardt, __
Mont. -, 554 P.2d 728 (1976).
25. - Mont. -, 560 P.2d 905 (1977).
26. Id. at 907-08.
27. - Mont. __, 567 P.2d 459 (1977).
28. Id. at 462-63.
[Vol. 39
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modification of custody as "heavy . . .to prevent . . .ping-pong
custody litigation . ".. 29
Once more in the case In re Dallenger, the noncustodial parent
(this time the appellee) argued that "the best interests of the child,"
liberally construed, should support a modification decree, even if
the strict letter of the statute were not met. The supreme court
responded with a strong defense of strict construction which is worth
quoting in full, since it defines current Montana policy in this area:
Section 48-339 requires a showing of a change in circumstan-
ces and that modification is necessary to serve the best interests
of the child. The statute is specific, however, in pointing out how
these standards are to be applied. No change in custody may be
made unless subsections (a), (b), or (c) under section 48-339(2) are
satisfied. Here only subsection 2(c) is applicable, and it requires:
(1) the physical, mental, moral, or emotional health of the child
be endangered in its present environment; and (2) the advantages
to the child of a change in custody outweigh the harm likely to be
caused by such a change.
This burden put on the party seeking a change in custody was
developed intentionally to further the policy that custody ought to
be difficult to change after a decree is made. The Comment of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
quoted by this Court in Holm v. Holm, - Mont. -, 560 P.2d
905, 908, 34 St. Rep. 118, 121, states in part:
"Most experts who have spoken to the problems of post-
divorce adjustment of children believe that insuring the de-
cree's finality is more important than determining which par-
ent should be the custodian. See Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
Syracuse L. Rev. 55 (1969). This section is designed to max-
imize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child) with-
out jeopardizing the child's interest. .. ."
In light of these policy considerations in addition to the clear
language of the statute, we cannot hold the statute is satisfied
where the court finds only that the interests of the children would
be "best served" by a change in custody, and that such a change
would be "to the environmental benefit" of the children. For the
court in this case to have jurisdiction to modify a custody decree
under section 48-339, there must be a finding of danger to the
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health of the children in
their present environment, and a finding that the harm likely to
be caused by such a change is outweighed by its advantages to
them. Here, there simply were no such findings.
29. Id.
30. __ Mont. -, 568 P.2d 169 (1977).
1978]
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Respondent argues the ultimate determination under the stat-
ute is still the best interests of the child and a finding to that effect
necessarily includes a finding that one of the subsections to section
48-339(2) is satisfied. We agree the final decision remains the tra-
ditional "best interests" decision. . . . But the subsections to sec-
tion 49-339(2) are jurisdictional prerequisites to modification
which were placed there to serve the basic policy behind the entire
section, the policy of custodial continuity. To allow these crucial
issues to be resolved merely by reference to the best interests of the
children would seriously weaken the statute. We hold the district
court did not comply with the correct statutory standards set out
in section 48-339(2)(c), R.C.M. 1947.1'
Lest any doubt remain as to the law in Montana relating to
modification, the court in Giannotti v. McCracken peremptorily
reversed a lower court modification order based on changed circum-
stances of the noncustodial parent.32 And in Schiele v. Sager,3 3 in a
paragraph replete with recent citations, it reversed another modifi-
cation based on "changed circumstances" and on "best interest,"
but not on one of the three conditions specified in the statute.
C. Jurisdiction to Modify a Foreign Custody Decree
In 1973, Montana reached the nadir of its participation in what
one commentator has called "the disgraceful interstate custody bat-
tles that rage . . .with children as the weapons" in Roebuck v.
Roebuck.34 There, with the child having been kidnapped from Ore-
gon during visitation, and a contempt proceeding pending in Oregon
against the plaintiff for disobedience to its decree, the Montana
supreme court upheld a trial court modification of custody and
found that "physical presence of the minor child vests courts with
jurisdiction to determine custody where the welfare of the child is
31. Id. at 171-72.
32. __ Mont. -, 569 P.2d 929 (1977). The facts of this case exemplify one of two
typical patterns under which modifications were often sought (and granted) in the past, based
on changed circumstances of the noncustodial parent. Here, the separation agreement had
included a provision for re-negotiation as to custody if the mother remarried. She did, set up
family housekeeping, and expected to regain her children. The trial court appeared to fulfill
this expectation, but was reversed. The other common situation is where the noncustodial
parent, usually the mother, suffers from severe emotional or financial disruption at the time
of divorce, and the best interests of the child dictate custody be awarded to the father. In
the past, the non-custodial parent who after a period of time regained the ability to serve as
a "fit and proper" parent, could bring a modification action on that basis. This was the
situation in Holm; the modification petition was dismissed.
One might venture to say it verges on malpractice to counsel divorce clients today to
make current decisions on custody on the basis of possible future modifications.
33. - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1142 (1977).
34. 162 Mont. 71, 508 P.2d 1057 (1973).
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concerned. ' '31 The same result did not ensue three years later. In a
landmark decision, 3 the court refused jurisdiction to a Washington
father who had kidnapped his children, and, keeping them in viola-
tion of a valid Washington custody decree, petitioned a Montana
court for modification based on changed circumstances. Finding
that the plaintiff had "unclean hands," that the court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the mother, and that the situs of the marriage
and the domicile of the child and mother was Washington, the court
granted a writ of supervisory control to dismiss the proceeding.
Thus, the court reached a result as sound as it would have been
compelled to reach by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
which is now the law in Montana.3 1
D. Adoptions and Youth in Need of Care
In Montana there are three procedures which may be used in
various circumstances to terminate parental rights. Children may
be removed from parents who are unwilling or unable to provide an
adequate home environment through custody proceedings initiated
under the "youth in need of care" statutes.3 Children may be placed
through adoption after consent of the natural parent(s),3 or pur-
suant to an order placing permanent custody with the right to con-
sent to adoption in the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services, following a finding that one of the exceptions to the re-
quired parental consent is applicable. 0 Parental rights of putative
fathers may be terminated through procedures provided in the Uni-
form Parentage Act.4'
The provisions of these three statutes may be interrelated in
many cases where the welfare and placement of children are at
issue. Consideration must also be given to the provisions of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act which, though focussed primar-
ily on custody awards in the context of marital dissolutions, have
implications for custody proceedings commenced in other contexts.
It should be noted that the threshold requirement for termina-
tion of parental rights through adoption is different than for termi-
nation following a finding that the child is a "youth in need of
care"-the terminology which is applied to all children who fall
35. Id. at 76, 508 P.2d at 1060-61.
36. State ex rel. Muirhead v. District Court, __ Mont ___, 550 P.2d 1304 (1976).
37. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 61-401 to 61-425, enacted Ch. 537, Laws of Montana (1977), effec-
tive July 1, 1977. Under § 61-415, the court in Roebuck would have had to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction because of its finding that the Oregon court had concurrent jurisdiction in the
matter.
38. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 10-1301 to 10-1322 (Supp. 1977).
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-205(1) (Supp. 1977).
40. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-205(1)(a)-(f), (2) (Supp. 1977).
41. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 61-301 to 61-327 (Supp. 1977).
1978]
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within the statutory definitions of abused, neglected or dependent
children. The Montana supreme court has been consistent in hold-
ing that strict compliance with the statutory provisions regarding
consent by the natural parent to adoption, or a finding of a valid
exception, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the issuance of a valid
adoption decree.42 In Re Biery, a much-cited case in subsequent
decisions, states the policy reasons for requiring strict compliance:
"while the best interests of the child are of utmost concern in both
custody and adoption cases, we have required strict compliance
with section 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, because of the harshness of per-
manently terminating parental rights. '4
Custody proceedings initiated under the "youth in need of
care" statute constitute the primary exception to the parental con-
sent requirement. Once a child has been determined to be a youth
in need of care, the court may in its discretion terminate the rights
of the parent(s), and allow the adoption of the child without con-
sent. The threshold requirement in these cases, however, is a clear
finding of parental unfitness. The court in a recent case4 held that
§ 10-1312 "make[s] plain that a finding of abuse, neglect or de-
pendency is the jurisdictional prerequisite to any court ordered
transfer of custody. It is then, and only then, that the 'best interest
of the child' standard has its application . . . .'"
The uncertain interplay of the child custody statutes is illus-
trated by a recent case, in which the court voided an adoption
decree but placed permanent custody in the adoptive parents."
Finding that the natural mother had not received notice of, nor
given consent to the adoption, the court held the adoption decree
void for want of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it refused to return the
42. In re Biery, 164 Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377 (1974); In re Smigaj, - Mont.
560 P.2d 141 (1977).
43. In re Biery, 164 Mont. at 359, 522 P.2d at 1380 (1977).
44. In re Fish, - Mont. - , 569 P.2d 924 (1977).
45. Id. at -, 569 P.2d at 927. The court continued:
• . . It is important to note the mother was never. . . declared to be unfit to have
the custody of the children. This being so, the district court had no jurisdiction to
take the children away from their natural mother. The 'best interests of the child'
test is correctly used to determine custody rights between natural parents in divorce
proceedings. In this situation the 'equal rights' to custody which both the father
and mother possess under section 61-105, R.C.M. 1947, are weighed in relation to
each parent's ability to provide best for the child's physical, mental, and emotional
needs upon the breakdown of the marital relationship. 'Fitness' of each parent is
determined only in relation to the other and not to society as a whole. However,
where third parties seek custody, it has long been the law in Montana that the right
of the natural parent prevails until a showing of a forfeiture of this right. (Citing
cases). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act does not change this law. This
forfeiture can result only where the parent's conduct does not meet the minimum
standards of the child abuse, neglect and dependency statutes.
46. In re Adoption of Hall, - Mont. -, 566 P.2d 401 (1977).
[Vol. 39
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child to the mother, who had sought not only to void the decree but
had requested the child's return upon a writ of habeas corpus. In-
stead the court upheld the trial court's quashing of the writ, and its
award of custody to the adoptive parents pursuant to a hearing held
by agreement of the parties as to the best interests of the child. The
natural mother was not found to be unfit, but the court agreed that
the best interests of the child would be served by his remaining with
the adoptive parents, now permanent custodians.
In this case, the child had been adopted when it was less than
a month old and was, at the time of the hearing, four and a half
years old-a fact which no doubt carried considerable weight in the
placement determination. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Shea char-
acterized the decision as one which could be interpreted as allowing
"adverse possession" of children. "In effect, this Court is holding
that permanent custody of a child can be acquired by a hybrid form
of adverse possession and it does not matter that the initial posses-
sion was acquired by illegal means." 7 Despite the fact that the court
has often rejected the contention that custody and adoption pro-
ceedings which result in placement of children with non-parents for
extended periods, operate to bar custody in the natural parents, 8 it
is clear that the practical effect can be to increase the likelihood of
permanent placement with the non-parental custodian. Both the
legislature and the courts have recognized this problem and have
attempted to remedy it. The "youth in need of care" act provides
that custody cases should be given priority before the courts, a
policy which was emphasized by the supreme court in the Fish
case.
49
The dissent in Hall raises another significant issue. Under the
UMDA, petitions to modify custody decrees can be filed only after
a two-year period, or else must show that the child's physical, men-
tal, moral or emotional health is being "endangered seriously" in its
present environment. 50 In this case, the natural mother, who origi-
nally lost her child through an invalid adoption proceeding, was
denied custody following a hearing on the best interests of the child,
wherein no finding of her unfitness to have the child was made.
Such a hearing would appear to violate the Fish principle that best
interest cannot be a factor until a threshold showing of parental
unfitness is made. Nevertheless, the mother in Hall will be unable
to make any attempt to modify custody for another two years, at
47. Id. at __, 566 P.2d at 405.
48. In re Fish, - Mont. at -, 569 P.2d at 928-29.
49. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1310(2) (Supp. 1977); In re Fish, - Mont. at -, 569 P.2d
at 929.
50. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-339(1) (Supp. 1977).
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which time it is likely that the argument for the child remaining
with the present custodians will be even stronger, it being admitted
by all that they are proper custodians. Her only recourse may be a
petition for reasonable visitation rights under the UMDA.
As previously noted, many of the adoption cases considered by
the court in recent years turn on the question of consent, or the
finding of a statutory exception. In a case decided in May, 1977, In
Re Adoption of Challeen,5' a district court's adoption decree in favor
of the stepfather was reversed because the petitioner failed to estab-
lish an exception under § 61-205(1)(f). That section provides that
consent is not required for adoption if the parent has not contrib-
uted to the support of the child for a period of one year prior to the
petition, if able to do so. Petitioner proved that the natural father
had not contributed to the support of the child for over five years
but failed to prove that he had the ability to do so. The court made
a similar holding in an earlier case, In Re Smigaj,52 in which the
term "support" was construed to mean financial support only.
Appointment of counsel for the child in custody disputes has
been discussed by the court in several recent cases. In Stubben v.
Flathead County Department of Public Welfare,53 the court noted
that it is within the district court's discretion under § 10-1310(12)
to appoint counsel for the child, but held that in this case it was not
error for the court to have failed to do so. Less than a year later,
however, in In Re Gullette, 1 the court adopted the Oregon rule that
"where custody is in serious dispute, the court shall appoint inde-
pendent counsel for the child or make a finding stating the reasons
such appointment was unnecessary. 5 5 That holding seems to indi-
cate a tendency by the court to go further than in previous years
toward recognition that the interests of the child may be different
from either those of the natural parent or of other persons seeking
custody. In the Fish case, where counsel for the child was retained
by the persons seeking adoption, the court emphasized that counsel
for the child must in fact be independent."6 In Schiele v. Sager,57
reversing and remanding a modification of custody determination,
the supreme court for the first time explicitly directed the trial court
to appoint independent counsel to represent the child. Whether this
51. - Mont. , 563 P.2d 1120 (1977).
52. - Mont. -, 560 P.2d 141 (1977).
53. - Mont. , 556 P.2d 904 (1976).
54. - Mont. -, 566 P.2d 396 (1977). A new opinion was rendered on July 8, 1977,
after the case was resubmitted, but the adoption of the Oregon rule was unaffected.
55. Id. at -, 566 P.2d at 400.
56. In re Fish, __ Mont. at -, 569 P.2d at 928.
57. Schiele v. Sager, - Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1142 (1977).
[Vol. 39
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will become a common procedure in Montana remains to be seen.18
Other supreme court rulings which will affect the outcome of
cases involving child placement address the question of the admissi-
bility of welfare reports. In early 1976 the court decided In Re Fisher
and Ronquillo,59 reversing a district court decree awarding perma-
nent custody to the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Serv-
ices. Petitioner, in attempting to prove the mother an unfit person
to have custody, relied on a "report to the court" prepared by the
County Department of Public Welfare. The court ruled the evidence
was hearsay and therefore inadmissible, resulting in an insufficiency
of credible evidence to sustain the lower court's decree. The follow-
ing year that holding was refined in In Re Swan, Youths in Need of
Care,6" where similar reports were held to be inadmissible as hearsay
evidence. The court in Swan stated that all procedural rules must
be followed in cases involving termination of parental rights since
"[a]ny relaxing of these procedural rules would create a custody
procedure ripe for abuse . . . . Unsworn reports where there is no
right to cross-examine come within the hearsay rule and are inad-
missible.""'
The court in Fisher" noted that the question of privilege be-
tween a social worker and the mother whose rights were sought to
be terminated had been raised, but did not consider the matter
since the insufficiency of evidence was determinative. It seems
likely, however, that a parent's assertion that a social worker cannot
testify against him because of privileged communications between
the two will be considered in a subsequent case.
Another aspect of adoption and custody proceedings was re-
cently clarified by the supreme court. The court affirmed a decision
of the district court consolidating matters before it, and delaying
decision until all petitioners had been heard. Two competing adop-
tion petitions and a third petition by the county to have the child
declared a youth in need of care were before the court in separate
actions. Adoption was awarded and the petitioner who did not
receive the child alleged error in the district court's decision to hear
all petitions before ruling. The court held that the paramount con-
sideration in these cases is the best interest of the child and that
58. It also remains to be seen who will pay for counsel if such appointments do become
common. The legislature modified the national draft of this section in a manner aimed
apparently at deterring such appointments. Compare R.C.M. 1947, § 48-324 with UMDA §
310, 9 U.L.A. 495 (1973).
59. - Mont. , 545 P.2d 654 (1976).
60. __ Mont. __, 567 P.2d 898 (1977).
61. Id. at , 567 P.2d at 900.
62. In re Fisher, __ Mont. at __, 545 P.2d at 654-55.
63. In re Adoption of Redcrow, - Mont. -, 563 P.2d 1121 (1977).
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the district court was correct in its disposition. The court also ruled
that the district court's finding that both of the couples petitioning
for adoption would be suitable adoptive parents was not equivalent
to a finding that each would equally promote the best interests of
the child.
No cases have yet been decided under the Uniform Parentage
Act. It should be noted, however, that a primary purpose of this act
is to provide putative fathers 4 with certain rights, one of which is
the right to consent to adoption. Putative fathers must be given
notice of any action in which parental rights may be terminated, "5
and may be considered as potential custodians of their children.
II. PROPERTY DIVISION
With the adoption of the UMDA, Montana officially joined
many other jurisdictions in recognizing the marital partnership con-
cept in property division.6 The marital partnership or shared enter-
prise concept places equal weight upon the financial and personal
contributions of the parties in a marriage. Upon the dissolution of
that relationship the district court is directed by statute
"equitably" to apportion property and assets owned by the parties.
Property apportionment provides the dependent spouse an alterna-
tive to traditional alimony and "encourages the court to provide for
the financial needs of the spouse by property disposition rather than
by an award of maintenance.""
Prior to the effective date of the Act, Montana case law on
property division incident to divorce tended to embody a marital
partnership concept. In a 1977 decision, Biegalke v. Biegalke, s the
Montana supreme court outlined the major cases on property divi-
sion since 1960. Even though some of the cases pre-date the Act by
fifteen years, the court concluded that "the provisions of the Act for
consideration of property division are very similar to the case law." 9
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-305 (Supp. 1977).
65. R.C.M. 1947, § 61-325 (Supp. 1977).
66. Krauskopf, A Theory for 'Just' Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L.
REv. 165 (1976). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws made a similar
recommendation. The Commissioners urged that the "distribution of property upon the
termination of marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets
incident to the dissolution of a (business) partnership." HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWS 111, note 3, at 178 (1970).
67. Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 493 (1973).
68. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. -. , 564 P.2d 987 (1977).
69. Id. at -, 564 P.2d at 990. The court based its decision upon prior case law and
not the Act as such. However, in Zell v. Zell, _ Mont. - , 570 P.2d 33 (1977), the court
said that "[R.C.M.] section 48-321(1) controls the district court's consideration and disposi-
tion of the marital property. Guidelines for the district court's consideration in a property
division were outlined by the court in Biegalke." 570 P.2d at 35.
[Vol. 39
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/1
FAMILY LAW
It then set forth ten "guidelines" drawn from the cases. Since
Biegalke has since been cited in every property division case decided
under the UMDA, the principles enunciated in its "guidelines"
must be considered in conjunction with the Act.
A. Property Division and the Act
Promoting a policy of minimum court involvement in divorce,
the Act encourages parties to a marriage independently to divide
their property, and to settle their own financial affairs by agree-
ment. 0 The parties to the marriage may in a written separation
agreement dispose "of any property owned by either of them, and
[for] support, custody, and visitation of their children."'" Then in
a dissolution proceeding, the terms of the separation agreement,
except those concerning the support, custody and visitation of chil-
dren, will be binding upon the court, unless found unconscionable. 7
Separation agreements found not unconscionable may be set out in
the separation or dissolution decree, or may be identified in the
decree. They will then have behind them all enforcement powers
related to judgments, including contempt, and will also be enforce-
able as contract terms.73
In case there is no agreement as to property, the Act permits a
district court equitably to apportion between the parties "the prop-
erty and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever
acquired, and whether the title thereto is in the name of the hus-
band or wife or both."74 The Act establishes a variety of tests to be
used in dividing up the property,75 and also provides for the division
70. State Bar of Montana Continuing Legal Education, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Acr 15 (1975); Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women, RECOGNITION OF ECONOMIC
CONTRIBUTION OF HOMEMAKERS AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN DIVORCE LAW AND PRACTICE,
(CACSW Item 40-N, 1975); Comment, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, supra n.6 at
126.
71. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(1) (Supp. 1977).
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(2) (Supp. 1977).
73. See Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 489 (1973).
74. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321(1) provides:
In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or disposition
of property following a decree of dissolution of marriage or legal separation by a
court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdic-
tion to dispose of the property, the court, without regard to marital misconduct,
shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, finally equitably apportion
between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both however and
whenever acquired, and whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or
wife or both. (emphasis added)
The portions of the statute italicized above were those emphasized by the Montana Supreme
Court in the recent case Morse v. Morse, __ Mont. -, 571 P.2d 1147 (1977). The court
there stated that the plain meaning of the provisions expresses the law.
75. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321(1) provides:
In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and
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of property acquired prior to the marriage or individually during the
marriage.7"
B. Equity Court's Power in the Disposition of Property
The powers of the district court in the apportionment of the
property and assets of the parties are far-reaching and pervasive. Its
equitable jurisdiction allows it to make a division of the property
and assets of the parties according to their contributions to the
marital partnership. In such an allocation the district court is
guided by general standards of "reasonableness.""
Until rather recently, however, one might not be able fully to
adjudicate real property rights in an action for divorce in Montana.
In Rufenach v. Rufenach,5 the supreme court affirmed a district
court finding that it had no power to divest title in one spouse in
order to transfer title to the other spouse.79 In 1971, Libra v. Libras°
expressly overruled earlier cases holding that district courts in di-
vorce actions lacked power to adjust certain property interests of the
parties. The court found that under "proper circumstances" it "may
completely divest the wife of her interest in property and provide
for the payment of alimony in lieu thereof."'"
Now the district court's power has been established and defined
prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health,
station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employabil-
ity, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether
the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity
of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution or dissipation of value of the respective estates, and the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.
76. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321(1) further provides:
. . . In disposing of property acquired prior to the marriage; property acquired
by gift, bequest, devise or descent; property acquired in exchange for property
acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent; the increased value of property acquired prior to marriage; and
property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation, the court shall
consider those contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, including the
nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; the extent to which such contributions
have facilitated the maintenance of this property and whether or not the property
disposition serves as an alternative to maintenance arrangements.
The foregoing language is not in the national draft, but was apparently thought necessary to
abrogate definitively the former Montana law governing disposition of previously-acquired
property of spouses.
77. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at -, 564 P.2d at 989.
78. Rufenach v. Rufenach, 120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293 (1947). Accord, Emery v.
Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251 (1948).
79. "There is no authority either in the statutes of Montana or in the decisions of this
court, in an action for divorce, to divest the title of the husband to his property and to adjudge
or order an involuntary assignment and transfer thereof to the wife." Rufenach, 120 Mont.
at 353, 185 P.2d at 293.
80. Libra v. Libra, 157 Mont. 252, 484 P.2d 748 (1971).
81. Id. at 258, 484 P.2d at 751-52. 16
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both by case law and the Act. 2 In Cook v. Cook, 3 the Montana
supreme court described the boundaries of the district judge's dis-
cretionary power to carry out property division as "fettered only by
the range of reason and his judgment will not be disturbed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion." 4 In addition, courts have statu-
tory direction from the Act specifying that the judge is to look at
all the relevant circumstances of the marriage to arrive at an equita-
ble apportionment of the property and assets of the parties.
Although no particular pleading is necessary to give the district
court equitable jurisdiction, the parties must be put on notice in the
pleadings of the request for property adjustment.85 The Act specifies
that in granting a decree for dissolution of marriage the district
court must consider "the disposition of property," and requires that
the petition specify "the relief sought." 8
After the court has gained equitable jurisdiction, it has the
power to grant complete relief.8 7 In Houser v. Houser,"s both parties
to an annulment requested that the court divide their personal and
real property. When the court granted the real property acquired
jointly prior to the marriage solely to the wife, the defendant-
husband appealed. The court noted that in his pleadings and ap-
proach at the trial, the defendant-husband "clearly requested the
district court to use its equitable powers to make a disposition of the
home. He cannot now complain the district court had no right to
do so."8
82. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at -, 564 P.2d at 989. The Biegalke case set
forth a number of "guidelines" to be used in property division decisions. They are quoted
hereafter as numbered by the court:
1. The district court does have the jurisdiction to make an equitable adjust-
ment of property rights between the husband and wife.
83. 159 Mont. 98, 495 P.2d 591 (1972).
84. The Cook language has also been cited in Roe v. Roe, - Mont. -, 556 P.2d
1246, 1248 (1976).
85. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at __, 564 P.2d at 989.
2. No particular pleading is necessary, nor is any recognized cause of action
necessary to give the court such jurisdiction. The only requirement is that the
language in the pleading puts the parties on notice that the court is being asked to
make such an adjustment.
86. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 48-316(1)(d), 48-317(2)(f) (Supp. 1977). Whether a dissolution
petition, without more, puts a party on notice that property rights will be adjudicated is an
unanswered question.
87. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at -, 564 P.2d at 989:
3. The jurisdiction of the court to make such adjustment is founded on its
inherent power in equity cases to grant complete relief.
88. Houser v. Houser, - Mont. -, 566 P.2d 73 (1977).
89. Id. at - , 566 P.2d at 74-75. The trial court found that even though title was
placed in both names as joint tenants, the defendant-husband "had no ownership rights in
the property, except a security interest for repayment" on the downpayment borrowed from
his father.
17
Mahan: Recent Developments In Family Law In Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1978
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
One requirement necessary for the court to grant complete re-
lief is that the court must have the full and complete valuation of
all property of the parties accumulated at the time of the marriage
and divorce. 0 The Act gives the court the power to apportion prop-
erty belonging to either spouse however and whenever acquired and
regardless of who holds title. Property acquired during a marriage
is divided on an equitable basis regardless of which married party
holds title and which party made the financial contribution."
In LaPlant v. LaPlant,92 a pre-UMDA case, the supreme court
repeated the well established rule. "It has already been at least
twice decided in this State that the trial court may make an equita-
ble division of the litigants' property in a divorce action regardless
of the state of title to that property and regardless of actual financial
contribution. '9 3 The defendant-husband in Downs kept all the title
of property in his own name during a nineteen year marriage to the
plaintiff-wife. The court held that the property "division should be
on an equitable basis regardless of who had title to the property." 4
C. Contribution or Court Discretion Based on Contribution of the
Parties
The exercise of a district judge's discretion is not based on a
fixed formula or ratio.95 Instead, adjustment of property rights must
be reasonable under the circumstances of each particular case." As
a guide to the courts, the Act specifies eighteen considerations
which should control judicial property divisions. 7
One gauge used by the court in its discretionary exercise of
property division power is the contribution of the parties.
"Contribution" means more than a narrow concern with financial
contribution. 8 Contribution is to be broadly construed: it may in-
90. Downs v. Downs, __ Mont. , 551 P.2d 1025, 1026-27 (1976).
91. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at __, 564 P.2d at 989:
4. The title to or possession of property (except as to property not acquired
by the joint efforts of the parties) cannot defeat the power of the court to make such
an adjustment.
In view of the broad language of the Montana UMDA, this is undoubtedly a misleadingly
restrictive statement of the rule. Compare Notes 74 and 76 above, with the Biegalke formula.
92. __ Mont. - , 551 P.2d 1014 (1976).
93. Id. at -, 551 P.2d at 1015-16.
94. Downs v. Downs, - Mont. at - , 551 P.2d at 1026-27.
95. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at -, 564 P.2d at 989:
6. The court's exercise of its discretion in adjusting property rights between
husband and wife must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case and there
is no fixed formula or ratio to be applied in each instance.
96. Eschenburg v. Eschenburg, - Mont. -. , 557 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1976); Zell v.
Zell, __ Mont. -, 570 P.2d 33, 35 (1977).
97. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321 (Supp. 1977).
98. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at -, 564 P.2d at 989:
[Vol. 39
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clude cash;99 equity in land; °00 work done as a ranch wife, home-
maker and mother;'0 ' work done as a farm laborer;' 2 and work done
as a career officer's wife, homemaker and mother including volun-
teering and social activities affecting a husband's career.0 3
In Berthiaume v. Berthiaume,°4 the supreme court found an
abuse of the trial court's discretion in its award of 90% of the prop-
erty acquired in the marriage to the husband. The wife worked for
four of the six years of the marriage and then had left work to care
for their two children. The court remanded back to the district court
to have the decree conform to its finding of fact that "[t]he proper-
ties of the parties should be divided as equally as possible."'0 5
In spite of all this, the supreme court at times seems reluctant
to alter a trial court's disposition of property, which on its face
appears unfair. In Rogers, the plaintiff-wife contributed over
$40,000 during six years of marriage and received only $23,500 in the
final award. The supreme court found that the defendant-husband
"[flor five years . . . had a wife, a homemaker, a companion, and
a provider for the home at no cost to him."'0 6 Yet the court did not
find that the trial court abused its discretion.07
The court has also recognized practical matters to be consid-
ered in the property division. The marital property's size and value
should be considered with an eye to the needs and abilities of the
parties to support themselves.' The Act specifically provides that
5. There is no presumption of gift as between husband and wife in property
matters.
7. In exercising its discretion, the court's adjustment of property rights, must
be reasonable and equitably related to the "contribution" of the parties to the
acquisition of such assets.
8. In determining "contribution," the court may consider cash contributions;
work or effort directly furthering the acquisition or increase in value of marital
assets; the performance of the ordinary duties of the wife or husband and any
extraordinary services performed by the wife or husband; and other matters in the
individual case which the court reasonably feels constitutes a "contribution," direct
or indirect, to such acquisition.
99. Rogers v. Rogers, - Mont. -_, 548 P.2d 141 (1976).
100. Roe v. Roe, __ Mont. -, 556 P.2d 1246, 1246-47 (1976).
101. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at __, 564 P.2d at 990.
102. Zell v. Zell, __ Mont. -, 570 P.2d 33.
103. Eschenburg v. Eschenburg, - Mont. at - , 557 P.2d at 1016.
104. __ Mont. __, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
105. Id. at __ 567 P.2d at 1390.
106. Rogers v. Rogers, - Mont. at - , 548 P.2d at 142.
107. Id. at - , 548 P.2d at 143. The court in effect partially reimbursed the wife for
actual financial contributions made during the marriage, and allowed nothing for time, labor
or other equity, even though the husband's estate was valued at $800,000. It should be noted
the husband was appealing the award, however.
108. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. at - , 564 P.2d at 989:
9. The court should consider the size or value of the estate to be adjusted and
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the court may set aside a portion of the property for any minor,
dependent, or incompetent children of the parties.'09
In considering the possible property adjustment, the divisibility
of the assets must be balanced with the possibility that payments
of money in lieu of a property division may be more advantageous. 0
In Biegalke the property division was accomplished in such a way
as to keep the ranch intact and operational."' House payments con-
stituted the property settlement in Thompson v. Thompson. "2 How-
ever, in Jones v. Flastad, " a percentage of income from any oil or
mineral leases, including royalty, bonus and rentals for twenty
years, was treated not as a transfer of property rights but only a
contract to provide support for the ex-wife. In contrast, the decree
in Englund v. Englund, I" labeled monthly payments of $400 to the
wife as "alimony" but the court held that the payments were
"obviously" intended to be a part of the "property settlement." The
precise relationship that should obtain between maintenance and
property division in a divorce settlement-contractual or judi-
the needs of the respective parties for support and their respective abilities to
support themselves.
109. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-321(2) (Supp. 1977) provides:
In a proceeding, the court may protect and promote the best interests of the
children by setting aside a portion of the jointly and separately held estates of the
parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and
general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent children of the parties.
110. Biegalke v. Biegalke, -Mont. at - , 564 P.2d at 989-90:
10. The court should consider the nature of the marital assets; whether or not
they are readily divisible; whether or not they, or any part thereof, are necessary
to one party or the other to carry out the terms of the court's decree, such as a
payment of money in lieu of property.
111. Id. at , 564 P.2d at 989.
112. Thompson v. Thompson, - Mont. - , 554 P.2d 1111 (1976).
113. Jones v. Flasted, - Mont. - , 544 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1976).
114. Englund v. Englund, - Mont. -, 547 P.2d 841, 842 (1976). The "property-
alimony" distinction remains one of the primary areas where the common law impinges upon
provisions of the UMDA with unpredictable effect. One of the most frequently-litigated
divorce questions in the 1970's in Montana, was the question of the susceptibility of a separa-
tion agreement to subsequent judicial modification. It was generally understood that a prop-
erty division was a final transfer, beyond the power of the court to alter, while transfers in
the nature of "alimony" were within the continuing jurisdiction of the court and capable of
modification upon motion and a showing of changed circumstances. Under one provision of
the UMDA, separation agreements which are set forth in the divorce decree may be modified
later by the court, unless modification as to any or all portions is limited or precluded by the
terms of the agreement itself. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(6). Under another provision, however,
modifications of property dispositions may not be made unless conditions justifying "the
reopening of judgments under the laws of this state" are found to be present. R.C.M. 1947, §
48-330(1)(ii) (Supp. 1977). How these provisions will be integrated with each other, and with
principles governing the effect of death or remarriage on alimony obligations, remains to be
seen. The question as to whether a particular disposition is in the nature of alimony, or
property division, is still an important one.
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cial-still constitutes a major area of uncertainty under the
UMDA."115
I. THE MONTANA COURT'S TREATMENT OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE
UMDA
Within the space of two years, the Montana UMDA has been
applied and construed by the supreme court twenty times."' More
than half of these cases have concerned the modification of custody
provision. As the foregoing discussion has indicated, 7 the construc-
tion of this provision has been marked by a gradually crystallizing
strictness-an increasing insistence of seeing its policy of stable
custody realized. For the most part, this tendency toward strict
construction has also characterized the court's dealings with other
portions of the statute. This attitude has been colored, however, by
the court's reiterated belief that the UMDA did not effect great
change in the evolving common law of this state.
A. Applicability
Because of the prevalence of litigation relating to divorce, and
the long-continuing nature of the courts' jurisdiction in such mat-
ters as custody and support, the framers of the UMDA designed an
elaborate provision articulating the extent to which the new statutes
should govern proceedings arising or commenced before the effective
date."'8 This provision was adopted without change by the Montana
legislature."' In the domestic relations cases decided since January
115. The recent case of Cromwell v. Cromwell, __ Mont. - , 570 P.2d 1129 (1977),
involved facts which seemed to afford an ideal basis for a comprehensive examination of the
relation of property division to maintenance under the Act. In the trial court, the wife had
been awarded a high proportion of the martial property, while the husband was relieved of
any maintenance obligation, in spite of the wife's inability to support herself immediately.
The wife appealed. The supreme court remanded for trial court reconsideration, without ever
discussing the question of what effect a division of property should have on a possible mainte-
nance award.
116. See Table I, infra, for an annotation of Montana cases construing the UMDA,
complete through Jan. 1, 1978, 570 P.2d, 34 St. Rptr.
117. Part I, supra.
118. UMDA § 502, 9 U.L.A. 513 (1973).
119. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-341 (Supp. 1977) provides:
Application. (1) This act applies to all proceedings commenced on or after its
effective date.
(2) This act applies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior
to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been
entered. Pending actions for divorce or separation are deemed to have been com-
menced on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. Evidence adduced after the effec-
tive date of this act shall be in compliance with this act.
(3) This act applies to all proceedings commenced after its effective date for
the modification of a judgment or order entered prior to the effective date of this
act.
21
Mahan: Recent Developments In Family Law In Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1978
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
1, 1976, the question of which law governed was an issue in surpris-
ingly few; but where it was, some interesting results ensued.
In Rogers v. Rogers, 20 a case obviously falling within the old
law, the court properly used the UMDA as persuasive authority for
the overall modernization characterizing Montana divorce law.121 In
two other cases, 2  in which notices of appeal from trial court action
on petitions for custody modification had been filed in 1975 (and to
which the UMDA was thus not applicable), the court declined to
decide what law was applicable, stating "it makes no difference
whether the new or old law controls.' 21 3 Since the standards for a
modification determination were held to be the same under both,
the court then proceeded to apply the UMDA standards to the facts.
There was not one domestic relations case decided in 1976 to
which the UMDA by'its terms applied.2 4 In 1977, the issue of applic-
ability was specifically raised four times; in the remainder of recent
cases, the Act was applied as a matter of course. The supreme court
in Solie v. Solie, 2.announced the UMDA was controlling on the
facts, but declined to say why. In Biegalke v. Biegalke,'2 1 the new
law was found not applicable to a divorce proceeding tried in district
court on September 18, 1975, where the findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment were promulgated January 20, 1976-a hold-
ing clearly incorrect under § 48-341(2). This mistake was not re-
peated, however, in Morse v. Morse,'21 on similar facts. Holm v.
Holm, 12 presented the question whether the UMDA was applicable
to a petition for modification of custody filed long before the effec-
tive date, but "continued" until 1976 because of prematurity. The
supreme court held the "continuation" insignificant, as expressing
merely the court's uninterrupted jurisdiction over child custody. In
a somewhat problematic holding, it found the UMDA applicable
(4) In any action or proceeding in which an appeal was pending or a new trial
was ordered prior to the effective date of this act, the law in effect at the time of
the order sustaining the appeal or the new trial governs the appeal, the new trial,
and any subsequent trial or appeal.
120. - Mont. - , 548 P.2d 141 (1976).
121. This marks perhaps one of the last family law cases in Montana to reach the
appellate level with counsel relying on outdated case law-a practice for which the court
showed little tolerance in its opinion.
122. Foss v. Leifer, - Mont. -_, 550 P.2d 1309 (1976); Erhardt v. Erhardt, -
Mont. -, 554 P.2d 758 (1976).
123. Id. at , 544 P.2d at 759.
124. Although there were fifteen domestic relations opinions handed down by the court
during 1976, appeals were pending in each one on January 1, 1976; so it was more than a year
after the effective date before the first UMDA case was decided by the supreme court.
125. - Mont. -, 561 P.2d 443 (1977).
126. - Mont. _., 564 P.2d 987 (1977).
127. __ Mont. , 571 P.2d 1147 (1977).
128. - Mont. __, 560 P.2d 905 (1977).
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partly because the 1976 petition for modification was based on
events which took place subsequent to the effective date. Under
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-341(2) and (3), the time when the transaction
occurred should not have been relevant.
B. Modification of Support
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-330(1)(a) provides that an order for support
or maintenance may be modified only upon "a showing of changed
circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms
unconscionable." One of the first questions raised after the passage
of the Act was whether this section would alter the former Montana
standard of "substantially changed circumstances" as justifying
modifications of alimony and support."9 The first appellate opinion
dealing with the question under the new law'"" did little to provide
an answer; the court seemingly remained satisfied with the old test.
The doubt still continues after the recent case of Gianotti v.
McCracken,'3 even though here a fairly traditional trial court order
increasing a father's support obligation was reversed as an abuse of
discretion. The supreme court said:
There was no showing the previously established child support
• . . is in any manner unconscionable under the present state of
facts. The district court made no specific finding of changed cir-
cumstances in this regard. There was no finding of an increased
need for support, nor an increased ability on the part of the father
to contribute to the support of his children.' 2
If need and ability to pay are both primary factors bearing on
"unconscionability," it is still not clear what, if anything, the term
adds to the "substantially changed circumstances" standard. It is
doubtful whether the supreme court's construction of unconsciona-
bility as applied to support and maintenance modifications will-or
could-parallel the interpretation of "unconscionability" as it re-
lates to the judicial evaluation of separation agreements, where the
word specifically retains much of its U.C.C. contract flavor. 33 It is
still too early to tell what additional burden, if any, will be imposed
on a plaintiff who seeks to modify a support or maintenance decree.
129. Comment, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, supra n. 6 at 127. For the most
recent articulation of the former standard, see Burris v. Burris, - Mont. -, 557 P.2d
287 (1976).
130. Solie v. Solie, __ Mont. -, 561 P.2d 443 (1977).
131. - Mont. __, 569 P.2d 929 (1977).
132. Id.
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C. Modification of Visitation Rights
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-337(2) indicates that, though a decree estab-
lishing visitation privileges may be modified in accordance with the
best interests of the child, a modification which has the effect of
restricting or denying a noncustodial parent's visitation must be
supported by evidence manifesting a more critical necessity than
simple best interest. The child's physical or emotional health must
be seriously endangered. The code comment makes clear that, as
with other aspects of the Act regulating parent-child relations in a
divorce, conduct of the parent which does not significantly affect his
relationship with the child is not to be considered in determining
his legal rights. 34 In Solie v. Solie,'35 a noncustodial father, who,
among other things, had been consistently uncooperative and delin-
quent in his support obligations, was stripped of a substantial part
of his visitation privileges by the court's decree. He argued on ap-
peal that this restriction of visitation was imposed as a punitive
measure, and relied heavily on the commission comment referred to
above. Without agreeing that the modification was punitive, the
court brushed aside the references in the comment to the irrelevance
of parental misconduct, as being based on the last sentence of § 402
of the national draft, which was omitted in Montana. 136 If the court
is serious in its view that those portions of the Act dealing with
parent-child matters (including original custody) are not based on
a no-fault concept because of the affirmative action of the legisla-
ture in omitting the last part of § 402, then it may be that the worst
fears of some of the UMDA's Montana proponents will prove justi-
fied.'37 Carried to its logical conclusion, this reasoning would allow
custody to be awarded in the original dissolution proceeding partly
or wholly on the basis of parental misconduct, including adultery.
Thus, it is not at all clear that an attorney can afford to ignore the
possible "fault" of his client if child-custody and related matters are
in dispute, even if the conduct at issue can be shown not to affect
the client's relationship with his child.
In addition, the recent case of Lee v. Gebhardt,3 while de-
manding the plaintiff meet a heavy burden of proof for modification
of custody, allowed the trial court to modify parental visitation
rights on the basis of a factual showing which once more appeared
to fall somewhat below the threshold established by the national
draft, when read in the light of the commission notes. It would
134. Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 407, 9 U.L.A. 509-10 (1973).
135. - Mont. -_, 561 P.2d 443 (1977).
136. Compare UMDA § 402, 9 U.L.A. 504, with R.C.M. 1947, § 48-332.
137. E.g., Comment, The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, supra n. 6 at 129.
138. - Mont. -_, 567 P.2d 466 (1977).
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appear that the more general and liberal standard of "the best inter-
est of the child" will govern petitions for a change or restriction of
the noncustodial parent's visitation rights in Montana.
D. Standing to Maintain a Custody Action
In Henderson v. Henderson, 39 the court applied the relevant
UMDA provisions 40 strictly to find that a non-parent had no stand-
ing to bring a custody action where the child was in the constructive
custody of one of the parents, following the death of the other.
Instead, as the UMDA commission comment'4' indicates, a "youth
in need of care" action" 2 is the only remedy for a party so situated.
Such a proceeding requires of the plaintiff a showing of parental
unfitness and gross misconduct to establish even a prima facie case.
Only then, does the "best interest of the child" standard come into
play.143
E. District Court Practice
Now, after almost two years under the UMDA, the supreme
court has begun to manifest irritation at trial court procedures de-
parting from those unequivocally prescribed by the Act. On four
occasions, 4 the court has found it necessary to upbraid judges and
attorneys below for ignoring the requirement that the court cause a
record to be made of any in-chambers interviews conducted with a
child whose custody is in dispute in a dissolution proceeding. One
can probably expect a harsher reaction in the future to neglect of
this procedure. The court has also felt compelled to outline in detail
the method to be followed in using investigatory reports in child
custody proceedings.' And impatience has been shown toward a
departure from the notice and other rules governing affidavit prac-
tice.'46 It is clear from these strictures, as well as from its severe
words concerning modification of custody, that the Montana su-
preme court entertains the firm expectation that the trial judges of
139. - Mont. __, 568 P.2d 177 (1977).
140. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-331(4)(b) (Supp. 1977).
141. Commissioners' Note to UMDA § 401, 9 U.L.A. 503-4 (1973).
142. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1301 to 1322 (Supp. 1977).
143. In re Fish, - Mont. -. , 569 P.2d 924 (1977); In re Doney, - Mont. -'
570 P.2d 575 (1977).
144. Solie v. Solie, - Mont. -, 561 P.2d 433 (1977); Ronchetto v. Ronchetto,
Mont. -, 567 P.2d 456 (1977); Gianotti v. McCracken, - Mont. -, 569 P.2d 929
(1977); Schiele v. Sager, - Mont. __, 571 P.2d 1142 (1977), all referring to R.C.M. 1947,
§ 48-334(1) (Supp. 1977).
145. tnchetto v. Ronchetto, __ Mont. -, 567 P.2d 456 (1977), referring to and
interpreting R.C.M. 1947, § 48-335(3) (Supp. 1977).
146. Henderson v. Henderson, - Mont. __, 568 P.2d 177 (1977), referring to
R.C.M. 1947, § 48-340 (Supp. 1977).
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this state will apply the provisions of the UMDA in their court-
rooms.
F. The Standard of Appellate Review of Factual Determinations
in Family Litigation
At the same time that it insists that the provisions of the
UMDA be applied strictly to the facts in family litigation, the su-
preme court has shown no inclination to depart from its traditional
policy of deference for trial court determinations of these facts. A
typical formulation, which may be found in numerous pre-UMDA
and current cases, is this:
This Court is committed to the view that the welfare of the child
is the paramount consideration in awarding custody and it must,
of necessity, be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge. He
hears the testimony, sees the witnesses' demeanor and has an ad-
vantage in determining these difficult problems and we will not
disturb the custody decision unless a clear abuse of discretion by
the trial court is demonstrated.1 7
Naturally, cases which result in reversals tend not to emphasize this
standard.
Although the review of any trial court factual determination is
conducted on the basis of a presumption of correctness, this pre-
sumption is particularly strong in divorce litigation, where the sen-
sitive and somewhat subjective nature of the decisions required to
be made militates strongly against "retrial by the appellate court."
It is unlikely that this standard will ever be significantly modified.
The one possibly noteworthy variation in recent Montana cases has
been the emphasis on a different aspect of the standard in appeals
involving property division. Here, it is said that the findings below
will not be overturned as an abuse of discretion unless the trial court
acted "arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judg-
ment or exceeded the bounds of reason, in view of all the circum-
stances, ignoring recognized principles resulting in substantial in-
justice."'4 8 What, if any, significance the distinctly different formu-
147. Lee v. Gebhardt, - Mont.., 567 P.2d 466, 468 (1977). Other recent cases
which have cited this Brooks standard are Tweeten v. Tweeten, - Mont. - , 563 P.2d
1141, 1143 (1977), and Solie v. Solie, - Mont. -, 561 P.2d 443, 446 (1977). For an even
more elaborate explanation of the standard, see Hurly v. Hurly, 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359
(1966). Another often cited pre-UMDA case is Gilbert v. Gilbert, 166 Mont. 312, 533 P.2d
1079 (1975), holding conventionally that "a finding of fact not supported by credible evi-
dence" amounts to an abuse of discretion.
148. Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, - Mont. -, 567 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1977); Zell v.
Zell, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 33, 35 (1977); Cromwell v. Cromwell, __ Mont. __, 570
P.2d 1129, 1129-30 (1977).
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lations possess for future appellate practice under the UMDA is
difficult to ascertain.
G. Relation to Former Law
Some of the most pressing questions the adoption of the UMDA
posed for the future direction of family law in Montana have already
been answered, with as much clarity as one can expect given such
brief experience; the answers to others remain vague or unexplored.
Right now, probably the most significant area of uncertainty is the
degree to which "immoral" conduct or other fault of a party will be
allowed to influence trial courts in proceedings involving the deter-
mination of parental rights and duties. There is such overwhelming
authority that it was a primary aim of the Conference to banish
forever from legal relevance considerations of parental conduct not
directly bearing on the parent-child relationship, that it will be
difficult for the supreme court to follow up the ambiguous step it
took in a contrary direction in Solie. Until a clear case presents
itself, however, the action of the legislature in striking out the last
sentence of UMDA § 402 will stand as an invitation to inject fault
(and scandal) into determinations supposed to be conducted for
"the best interests of the child." One hopes the Montana court is
prepared to meet this crucial and divisive issue forthrightly when it
appears suitably framed before the bench. 4 '
There is one recurring temptation that ought to be resisted in
future cases interpreting the UMDA. That is the temptation to
exaggerate the continuity of the law. When the supreme court states
at it did in Biegalke and in Foss,50 that the UMDA makes "no
change" in the previous Montana law, that is hyperbole, comforta-
ble but dangerous. And though a careful reading of recent pre-
149. In a recent case, In re Doney, - Mont. - , 570 P.2d 575 (1977), the supreme
court rejected the respondent's contention that a district court order divesting a natural
father of custody partly on the basis of a "disgraceful" liaison, was proper. However, the
respondent was a sister of the father's deceased wife, and therefore, absent a showing of abuse
or neglect, the best interest of the child standard could not be applied. The crucial case will
be a dissolution proceeding in which the custody determination is made on the basis of
notorious scandal. This may have happened in Brooks v. Brooks, - Mont. at -, 556 P.2d
at 902, decided after Erhardt and Foss, but silent as to the policy of the UMDA.
In Schiele v. Sager, - Mont. -_, 571 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1977), evidence of parental
misconduct was properly received because it affected the parent's relationship with the child.
The supreme court said however:
Although Montana chose not to adopt this particular language [UMDA § 402,
last sentence] case authority has established a precedent moving away from the
policy of admitting evidence of misconduct which did not effect [sic] the relation-
ship of the custodian with the child.
This would seem to indicate a return to the position of the uniform act.
150. Biegalke v. Biegalke, - Mont. __, 564 P.2d 987 (1977); Foss v. Leifer, -
Mont. -, 550 P.2d 1309 (1976).
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UMDA Montana cases on property division does reveal a striking
modernity in the principles adhered to, when the court, as in
Biegalke, sets forth ten traditional maxims as interpretive princi-
ples for the UMDA's provisions on property disposition, it embarks
on a perilous course that may return to haunt it in future cases. It
is one thing to look back and congratulate oneself upon anticipating
the direction pursued by modern legislation, but it is another to say
that modern legislation embodies just those principles enunciated
by cases decided under different laws. That is perhaps over-
indulging the judicial preference for the common law at the expense
of certainty in the courtroom and at the conference table.
H. Interrelation of Statutory Provisions
There are a number of questions which remain open concerning
the way in which various provisions of the UMDA affect one an-
other, and other areas of the law."' One vivid example: there is
clearly a strong policy of "freedom of contract" embodied in the
UMDA section'52 on separation agreements; as the statute itself
states, a written separation agreement, embodying the parties' own
negotiated solutions to the whole spectrum of problems incident to
divorce, is the best, indeed virtually the only way, to bring about
"amicable settlements of disputes between parties to a marriage
attendant upon their separation."' 53 Yet what if the parties' agree-
ments violate the essential policies of the UMDA? What if the Act's
promotion of freedom of contract conflicts, for instance, with the
Act's predominating policy of stable custody arrangements for
children? Are some of the traditional "shifting" custody arrange-
ments entirely ruled out? What about joint custody, now looked
151. The UMDA, of course, does not address itself to, nor does it solve, some of the
baroque jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws problems associated with divorce. For an excellent
illustration and discussion of the issues involved in a petition to modify a sister-state support
order, see Knodel v. Knodel, 14 Cal. 3d 752, 537 P.2d 353, 122 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1975). In
addition, actions under URESA (R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-2601-41 to 81) pose problems in the case
of mobile litigants; see e.g., the leading recent Montana case on the subject, Campbell v.
Jenne, - Mont. __, 563 P.2d 549 (1977).
Another area that will become increasingly important is property disposition and custody
determinations in the dissolution of non-marital domestic partnerships. This form of relation-
ship is so prevalent today that the traditional doctrine which ignores its existence is obsolete.
But the tenuous legal character of the relationship-and the fact it is entered into by the
parties with varying expectations, and is still disfavored by public policy-creates many
difficulties in handling problems incident to dissolution, though these problems often pre-
cisely parallel those treated by the UMDA. The leading case on the subject is Marvin v.
Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), holding the divorce code not
applicable to a non-marital dissolution, but equitably apportioning the property of the parties
in a manner analogous to that mandated by the UMDA.
152. UMDA § 306; see Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 488-90 (1973).
153. R.C.M. 1947, § 48-320(1) (Supp. 1977).
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upon with increasing disfavor?' '4 The Commissioners' Note to §
3061'1 indicates that the policies of the UMDA relating to children
should be enforced in spite of the agreement of the parties, and the
language of the law allows this result, but it does not compel it.1 56
There is wide latitude in the possible rules which might develop in
this area. How far can a practitioner, old-fashioned or newly ingen-
ious, go in formulating negotiated arrangements that suit his fancy,
or those of his client, before a trial judge can strike them down? How
far can he go before the judge must strike them down? These are
entirely open questions at present, but we may expect answers to
them before the end of the decade. In providing these answers, the
Montana supreme court has a very real opportunity for creative
jurisprudence: interpreting the UMDA is an open field.
154. See e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 567 P.2d 112, 113, n. 1 (Okl.App. 1977).
155. 9 U.L.A. at 489.
156. R.C.M. 1947, § 320(1) (Supp. 1977), provides that the parties "may" enter into a
separation agreement "containing provisions for . . . custody . . . of their children." The
court is in no way bound by this agreement, but one looks in vain in the Act for any language
forbidding the court to endorse the parties' agreed-upon custody arrangement, and it is only
by implication and by consulting the Commissioners' Note that one concludes the court is
expected to enforce the UMDA policies irrespective of the parties' own wishes.
TABLE I: TABLE OF MONTANA CASES CONSTRUING THE UMDA
UMDA SEC- TOPIC CASE
TION CON-
STRUED (S.R. - State Reporter)
(R.C.M. 1947)
48-301 et seq. Rogers v. Rogers, 33 S.R. Trend of state
328, 548 P.2d 141 (1976) public policy
48-321 Disposition of Biegalke v. Biegalke, 34 S.R.
property 403, 564 P.2d 987 (1977)
Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, 34
S.R. 921, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977)
Zell v. Zell, 34 S.R. 1070,
570 P.2d 33 (1977)
Cromwell v. Cromwell, 34 S.R.
1193, 570 P.2d 1129 (1977)
Morse v. Morse, 34 S.R. 1334,
571 P.2d 1147 (1977)
48-322 Maintenance Cromwell v. Cromwell, supra
48-323 Child support Berthiaume v. Berthiaume,
supra
48-324 Representation In re Gullette, 34 S.R. 277,
of child 566 P.2d 396 (1977)
Schiele v. Sager, 34 S.R.
1358, 571 P.2d 1142 (1977)
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Solie v. Solie, 34 S.R. 142,
561 P.2d 443 (1977)
Gianotti v. McCracken, 34
S.R. 1087, 569 P.2d 929
(1977)
Ronchetto v. Ronchetto, 34
S.R. 797, 567 P.2d 456 (1977)
State ex rel Muirhead v.
District Court, 33 S.R. 443,
550 P.2d 1304 (1976)
Henderson v. Henderson, 34
S.R. 942, 568 P.2d 177 (1977)
Tweeten v. Tweeten, 34 S.R.
337, 563 P.2d 1141 (1977)
Isler v. Isler, 34 S.R. 545,
566 P.2d 55 (1977)
Solie v. Solie, supra
In re Guilette, supra
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Ronchetto v. Ronchetto
supra
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Solic v. Solie, supra
Lee v. Gebhardt, 34 S.R.
810, 567 P.2d 466 (1977)
Holm v. Holm, 34 S.R.
118, 560 P.2d 905 (1977)
Groves v. Groves, 34 S.R.
790, 567 P.2d 459 (1977)
Ronchetto v. Ronchetto,
supra
Foss v. Leifer, 33 S.R.
528, 550 P.2d 1309 (1976)
Erhardt v. Erhardt, 33 S.R.
883, 554 P.2d 758 (1976)
Holm v. Holm, supra
Groves v. Groves, supra
Ronchetto v. Ronchetto, supra
Lee v. Gebhardt, supra
In. re Dallenger, 34 S.R.
938, 568 P.2d 169 (1977)
Gianotti v. McCracken,
supra
Schiele v. Sager, supra
Holm v. Holm, supra
Lee v. Gebhardt, supra
Henderson v. Henderson,
supra
Holm v. Holm, supra
Solie v. Solie, supra
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